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I. INfRODUcnON 
Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), originally introduced as Areas of Special 
Scientific Interest with the 1949 National Parks and Access to Countryside Act, 
provide the foundation for a major set of mechanisms protecting sites of high 
conservation value in Great Britain (i.e., procedures in Northern Ireland are 
excluded). In 1991 there were 5,671 SSSIs covering a total area of 1,778,474 ha, 
designated by reason of their flora, fauna, geological or physiographical features 
(NCC, 1991). The vast majority of these sites are in private ownership although three 
national statutory conservation agencies, English Nature, Scottish Natural Heritage 
and the Countryside Council for Wales, are responsible for the selection, designation 
and protection of SSSIs. Prior to the Environmental Protection Act of 1990, which 
introduced these three organisations, the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) had 
responsibilities for SSSIs within Great Britain. 
The mechanisms by which SSSIs are protected from urban industrial development, 
which requires planning permission, and rural development (agriculture, forestry) 
which does not require planning permission, are contained within an assortment of 
legislation (listed separately in the references). This legislation reflects the piecemeal 
fashion in which SSSI protection has evolved. Table 1 shows a continuing 
degradation of SSSIs; although, no SSSIs were entirely lost to development during 
1990-91; because of this degradation there is now disquiet within the conservation 
community over two aspects of SSSI protection. One concerns the adequacy of 
planning legislation to protect sites from urban/industrial development (Bain et al 
1990; Nash, 1990), particularly where 'statutory undertakers' are involved. The 
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second concerns the costs and effectiveness of the management agreement 
mechanisms implemented where SSSIs are threatened by rural development 
(Observer 5/4/92; Scotsman 4/9/91). 
This paper gives an overall outline of the current mechanisms by which development 
can take place and the extent to which SSSIs are protected. In particular we 
concentrate upon the threat of potentially damaging operations arising from rural 
development. Two models of SSSI protection are proposed and contrasted with the 
current process. Our analysis pinpoints tension between intrinsic and utilitarian value 
systems as the reason for current unease with the existing procedures. On the basis 
of this analysis, possible improvements on the existing situation are advanced. 
11. CURRENT SITE SAFEGUARD PROCESSES 
The site safeguard process involves several stages with different pathways for 
urban/industrial development control and rural development control. Both pathways 
start with the selection and designation of biological and earth science sites. 
Site Selection and Designation 
The primary objective in selecting biological SSSIs is to ensure a sufficient number 
and extent of sites are conserved to enable the protection of the total, national, 
special interest of the range in variation of habitat (Nature Conservancy Council 
1989). Site selection has two basic principles. First, the SSSI series should contain 
adequate representation of natural and semi-natural ecosystems from the total range 
of countryside variation and should provide an appropriate spread across the country. 
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Second, all sites which are identified as being at or above a critical standard of nature 
conservation value should qualify as SSSIs. 
The three national conservation agencies use their administrative districts as Areas of 
Search (ADS) for potential biological SSSIs. The aim is to ensure comprehensive 
coverage of SSSIs across the country giving a full range of climate, soil and land use 
history for anyone habitat. The ADS range in size from 400 square km to 4000 
square km with an approximate median of 2500 square km. Within each ADS the 
minimum aim is to represent all different habitats and species that are present by at 
least one and preferably the best example, provided the site(s) are above a certain 
minimum standard of quality. Dne example of habitat or population of a species per 
ADS is frequently considered to be insufficient, particularly where a habitat or species 
is rare. In such situations a larger proportion of the total remaining area or 
population is selected. 
Ratcliffe (1977) originally defined the criteria used to evaluate the nature 
conservation value of sites. Four interrelated qualitative criteria are currently used to 
establish minimum standards for habitat selection, as shown in Table 2(a) and three 
similar criteria are used for species groupings, as shown in Table 2(b). Each criteria 
is assessed independently and a site has to reach the qualifying standard in only one 
category to be eligible for selection. In the case of sites which are felt to be 
important but which fail to clearly qualify on a single attribute, the combination of all 
factors may be taken into account. 
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Application of the evaluative criteria has to be carried out against a background 
framework of reference which describes the range of variation in ecosystems, habitat 
and species which the SSSI series is intended to represent. Until recently there was 
no systematic framework of reference. In future, the National Vegetation 
Classification System (Rodwell 1991) will provide a standardised countryside 
description of the range of variation in natural and semi-natural vegetation against 
which proposed sites can be assessed. 
Sites of earth science interest are selected by a similar although less well developed 
process (NCC 1990). Ninety seven working subject blocks have been defined 
corresponding to stratigraphic time periods and divisions within the fields of igneous, 
metamorphic and structural geology; palaeotology; mineralogy and geomorphology. 
Within each block, potentially suitable sites are identified by literature searches and 
personal recommendations. These proposed sites are then evaluated against national 
and international site criteria. 
Under Section 28 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 all areas which merit the 
status of SSSI must be designated. The conservation agencies have no choice in the 
matter. Under the National Park and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, the 
conservation agency must notify the planning authority of SSSI designation, and under 
the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 they must notify the owner and occupier of the 
site, with whom there mayor may not have been discussion regarding designation. 
Following the conservation agency's intention to designate a new SSSI, three months 
are allowed for representations and objections. During this three month period 
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owners and occupiers are prevented from canying out damaging operations on the 
proposed SSSI; Section 2 of the Wildlife and Countryside (Amendment) Act 1985. 
On notification, each interested party will have received a statement of designation, a 
large scale map of the area designated, and a list of potentially damaging operations 
(PDOs). Depending on the type of habitat, this list may contain a score or more 
operations. Table 3 provides an illustrative list of PDOs for a raised peat bog 
habitat. The aim in providing this type of list is to identify actions which will reduce 
site conservation value, before they occur. 
Development Proposals Requiring Planning Permission 
Development of a SSSI can follow three routes, as shown in Figure 1; the planning 
process, PDOs procedure, or statutory undertaker process. Under Town and Country 
Planning legislation, development is defined as: the canying out of building 
operations, engineering operations, mining operations or other operations in, over or 
under the land; and the making of any material change in the use of any building or 
land. Both agriculture and forestry are excluded from the need to apply for planning 
permission for the above activities but must still be assessed under the potentially 
damaging operations criteria. If the developer is a 'statutory undertaker', such as the 
Department of Transport or a public utility, the planning restrictions and potentially 
damaging operations procedures are irrelevant. As the NCC noted to the Special 
Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA), the notification of sites 
as SSSIs is no guarantee of immunity from damage or threat from new roads (NCC 
1990 Section 2.4). Plans to expand the current road system threaten many 
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conservation sites and 161 SSSIs (Nash 1990). The procedure which statutory 
undertakers follow is unclear and varies from one undertaker to another, but 
generally seems to favour development. Thus, development matching the types of 
activities in the legislation require planning permission from the planning authority; if 
undertaken by anyone other than a statutory undertaker, or an agricultural or forestry 
concern. 
Designated areas, such as SSSIs, have a presumption against development built into 
planning policy guidance and development plans. That is, the developer is required 
to prove that the development should over-ride or could accommodate the nature 
conservation interest. If the proposed development is listed under Annex 1 or Annex 
2 of EC Directive 85/337 part of the evidence will involve an environmental impact 
assessment; with the Directive leaving such an assessment at the discretion of the 
local planning authority for Annex 2 developments. A public inquiry will be held if 
either: (i) the development application involving a SSSI is turned down and the 
developer appeals. or (ii) permission is granted but the nature conservation agency 
objects. At the public inquiry development proposals, conservation interests and 
other relevant issues will be presented prior to a decision on the development 
application. If the case is pursued a final decision will be taken by the Secretary of 
State. This process is shown in the flow diagram of Figure 2. Contrary to the case 
we examine below no compensation is paid to the developer if planning permission is 
refused on conservation grounds. 
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Development Proposals Not Requiring Planning Permission. 
The third avenue for a proposed development of a SSSI is via the PDO route 
explained in Figure 3. The provisions of Part 11 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
(1981) are activated in response to the landowner/occupier notifying the conservation 
agency of a proposal to carry out a PDO. Section 28 of the 1985 Act allows four 
months for the conservation agency to persuade the owner/occupier to abandon or 
modify the proposed PDO, and prevents the PDO from proceeding for this period of 
time. Most PDO notifications are of a minor nature. For example, Uvingstone et al 
(1990) estimate that 75%-90% of all PDO notifications in Scotland are consented to 
by the conservation agency with, perhaps, slight modification. In more major PDO 
cases, the conservation agency may offer a management agreement in accordance 
with Section 15 of the Countryside Act 1968 and the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967. 
Landowners or occupiers are not obliged to enter into a management agreement with 
the conservation agency although the number of such refusals in Scotland has been 
very small. Brotherton (1990) points to the importance of landowners being well 
disposed towards the statutory conservation agency in securing management 
agreements. 
A management agreement comprises two components. First, a set of management 
objectives are negotiated, normally consisting of restrictions on land use. Second, a 
compensatory payment is negotiated which will reflect the financial loss the 
owner/occupier is expected to sustain due to the restrictions placed on land use 
change by the management agreement. The Financial Guidelines issued by DOE 
(1987) set out the rules by which claims are negotiated. These provide for the 
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separate negotiation of each claim on the basis of profit foregone by the 
owner/occupier as a result of accepting the management agreement. A major 
criticism of management agreements is that owner/occupiers are compensated for not 
developing (ie. for doing nothing) rather than for any positive conservation 
management activity. As of 31 March 1992,2,032 management agreements protecting 
48,545 ha. at a cost of £7,238,932 were in place within Great Britain (NCe, 1991). 
If no agreement is reached within the four month negotiation period the conservation 
agency can, if they wish to pursue the case, seek a Section 29 order (under the 1981 
Act) from the Secretary of State extending the negotiation period to 12 months. If 
the 12 month period expires without an agreement being reached the owner/occupier 
is free to carry out the damaging operation, unless the conservation agency makes a 
compulsory purchase order before the end of the negotiating period. Compulsory 
purchase will only be undertaken if the conservation agency considers the land should 
be acquired in the national interest as a National Nature Reserve. There have been 
only two compulsory purchases in the last ten years (NCe, 1991). As an alternative 
to compulsory purchase the conservation agency may offer to lease the land or 
provide grants so assisting voluntary groups or charities to purchase the land. 
Ill. AGENCY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The procedure described above implies a certain minimum series of conservation sites 
is essential. The designation procedure forces the conservation agency (formerly the 
NCC) to accept all sites which pass the criteria. Thus, these criteria can be regarded 
as providing a threshold, dividing line, or standard of measurement for conservation 
8 
value. The NCC (1990 section 4.17) "believe the current level of notification and 
designation and the protection of individual sites should be seen as a minimum 
environmental safety standard for nature conservation". Under these circumstances 
any damaging operations will take society below the minimum standard. These sites 
are irreplaceable according to the NCC, and therefore need to be protected in an 
absolute sense. "Once such sites are damaged or lost they cannot be retrieved" (Ibid). 
In order to capture these concepts we advance the intrinsic value model of SSSI 
protection, but first a utilitarian model is developed because this seems to reflect the 
situations in which conservation agencies are finding themselves and the direction in 
which government is moving. 
A Utilitarian Model of Conservation 
The process of SSSI conservation has two stages; site selection and designation, and 
site protection. The first step under the utilitarian model is to recognise that no site 
can have absolute protection and therefore the selection process must be 
unconstrained. Under a utilitarian approach site selection would be made by the 
regulating agency with the aim of meeting specific conservation desires. These 
desires would include species preservation, habitat diversity, and maintenance of 
unique ecosystems. The greater the number and extent of such desirable features a 
site possesses, the greater the preference of the agency to designate the site for 
conservation. Thus, the agency can be viewed as selecting sites based on numerous 
characteristics which then determine the preference for conservation given to the site. 
There is no longer a threshold above which all sites must be protected. 
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The agency is put in a position whereby it must rank sites. Central to the need for 
ordinal ranking of sites is the fact that society has limited resources, and the agency in 
charge of conservation very limited resources. Thus, the decision to designate a SSSI 
will need to consider the additional burden that site will place upon the agency's 
budget. In economic terms the agency faces a constrained maximisation problem. 
Maximise conservation values given a fixed budget constraint. 
However, the picture is more complex than suggested so far. Any given site will have 
a minimum size below which the ecosystem is no longer sustainable. For example, a 
peat bog will become unstable and deteriorate if the area being preserved is too small 
and extraction of peat occurs on unprotected sections. Thus, when the agency is 
making a decision on site designation it has a discrete choice to make concerning the 
inclusion of a new site. Either the minimum site size is designated or the ecosystem 
is not conserved. Once a specific site is included into the SSSI scheme, the choice the 
agency faces is continuous in the sense that additions to the site area can be made so 
as to increase site integrity. Thus, a peat bog can be designated SSSI and then 
additional hectares of surrounding land added to increase the conservation value. In 
this way the agency has a choice between selecting new sites and making additions to 
established sites. 
Next, consider the role of the current landowner of the proposed SSSI. The owner 
has an opportunity cost to having the land used for conservation. This is the revenue 
gained in the alternative use. In the case of the peat bog, this could be the profit 
from peat extraction. The agency is then in a position of having to pay the owner the 
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opportunity cost per hectare. The agency will only be willing to pay up to a certain 
amount for a given site. The total amount will initially be the minimum number of 
hectares to sustain the site intact times the marginal willingness to pay. This marginal 
willingness to pay is dependent upon the discrete choice decision. Above a certain 
price per hectare, the agency will purchase nothing, but rather use the budget on 
additional hectares elsewhere. 
More formally, the budget (B) of the agency can be spent on new site selection (N) 
or current site maintenance and integrity. Site conservation can be obtained for an 
annual payment r. If we restrict the analysis to a single period, the budget constraint 
can be written: 
B=rN+pA 
where p is the price of additional hectares at other sites and A the number of 
hectares. If a site is conserved then N = 1 and if the site is not conserved N =0. The 
agency, as hypothesised above, has a utility function which can be written: 
U = f (N, A) 
The choices made by the agency will be 0 or 1 depending upon the indifference curve 
or preferences of that agency. If the agency chooses not to adopt the site, their 
expenditure on land areas will be B/p. If the agency adopts the site for conservation, 
the expenditure on other sites falls to (B-r)/p. Thus, the utility levels associated with 
adopting the site U l or rejecting the site Uo can be written: 
Uo = f{(B/p), O} and U l = f{(B-r)/p, I} 
Where the utility of adopting the site is greater than that of rejecting it (Ul > Uo), the 
site will be conserved. 
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Now consider the effect of different preferences over site characteristics within the 
agency or a different composition of the decision-making body, e.g., the effect of the 
NCC being split into separate agencies. This can be represented in the utility 
function by a vector Y. The utility function is then written U - f(N, A. Y). The 
utility function of the agency will be affected by differences in the SSSI 
characteristics. However, different experts and decision-makers will then designate 
different SSSIs due to their preferences expressed in Y. Thus, changing the 
composition of the agency will determine whether specific sites are designated or 
dropped. 
If the agency and circumstances are stable, so that Y is constant, and p is held 
constant the only variable influencing decisions is D. When the agency budget is 
restricted Uo is liable to be greater than U I . Under these circumstances the agency's 
demand for hectares for site integrity is low due to the budget and therefore the 
marginal disutility of a loss of this area is large compared to the gain from the new 
site. As the budget is increased, the hectares for integrity increase until the disutility 
of a decrease in Dip is outweighed by the benefit of new site conservation. 
Conversely, budgetary restrictions will force the agency to drop sites and compensate 
with increased hectares for integrity. 
Thus the agency is effectively facing a barrier to conservation in terms of the price 
per hectare negotiated with the landowner. Initially the agency will pay for a set tract 
followed by additions for integrity. These additions will become less important as the 
site increases beyond the minimum. Figure 4a represents the situation first described. 
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Here p. is the entry level price and DD the demand by the agency for hectares of the 
site. Below p. the willingness of the agency to pay for each additional hectare 
declines. The area of payment received by the landowner, assuming a fixed 
exogenous opportunity costs, would be given by the marginal cost times the number 
of hectares. For marginal costs above p*, nothing will be demanded by the agency. 
Below p* the number of hectares will be determined by the point of intersection of 
the marginal cost and demand curves. For example, given a marginal cost MCt the 
number of hectares demanded is qt. 
However, if the landowner can withhold the land or exaggerate the loss, the agency 
will be forced to pay more than MCt.qt. That is, the landowner can extract a certain 
amount of rent because the site is desired for conservation. A bargaining process will 
then take place where the landowner threatens a destructive use of the site in order 
to extract the maximum willingness to pay of the agency (or ability to pay given the 
intrinsic values discussed next). This strategy will be most effective for the landowner 
where a large number of hectares is desired for minimum purchase, and additions are 
of little value to the agency but the alternative uses of the land have a low marginal 
cost. As shown in Figure 4b, a landowner unable to prevent purchase would receive 
MCt.qt. However, if the landowner can withhold land or deceive the agency, the 
gains are relatively very large. The agency would pay p*.q* for the initial minimum 
number of hectares of the site. 
The implications of this process of bargaining are that a conservation agency with few 
powers will find itself paying above the actual marginal cost. As a result the budget 
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of the agency will be restricted. This in turn holds implications for the selection of 
new sites in that maintenance of the current stock of SSSIs becomes a priority. 
Utilitarian and Intrinsic Values 
Underlying the preceding analysis of agency decision-making for SSSI designation is 
the value of the site being considered. We have argued that the agency would be 
forced to express a valuation of the site via its willingness to pay. This, in turn, leads 
us to claim that at some level the cost per hectare will exceed the agencies' 
willingness to pay for the site. Such a process may be perfectly reasonable from a 
utilitarian perspective, but if the agency is trying to fulfil the protection of the 
intrinsic values of nature, a conflict arises. For any agency aiming to protect intrinsic 
values willingness to pay is a redundant concept and a different SSSI designation 
procedure would be necessary. However, before exploring this issue, the meaning of 
utilitarian and intrinsic value systems needs some consideration. 
A utilitarian philosophy sees only instrumental value in acts but intrinsic value in the 
consequences of those acts. Human welfare, or happiness, is then seen as the only 
intrinsically valuable thing. Under this homocentric view all other things are valuable 
only in so far as they serve to increase human welfare. The rightness or wrongness of 
an act is determined by the results that flow from it. 
Site conservation or preservation under the utilitarian value system is judged by the 
results in terms of human welfare. Thus, the reasons for conserving sites will include 
the potential for scientific research, maintenance of genetic diversity for medicine and 
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agriculture, recreation. solace, and aesthetic enjoyment (Passmore, 1974). These 
instrumental values by their influence on human welfare suggest the potential for the 
economic analysis of conservation benefits. Conservation is then only one possible 
alternative use of the site and must be weighed against others which may provide 
greater human welfare. 
This raises many issues concerning environmental valuation. cost-benefit analysis, and 
obligations to others (including other species or generations). However, without 
being distracted by other issues, the concern most relevant here is the potential for 
trade-offs. Conservation is but one goal in society and can. under a utilitarian 
philosophy, be over-ridden by other human interests. Where the value of a 
conservation site, compared to development use, is deemed relatively low the site will 
be destroyed by roads, housing estates, or resource extraction. 
The utilitarian argument can be countered by an appeal to rights, deontological 
ethical theories, and intrinsic value in things rather than humans. The first 
application of an ethical rights system in the modem tradition was in 1215 at 
Runnymede where the Magna Carta forced King John to recognise the 'natural rights' 
of certain barons (Nash, 1989). The concept has since extended across classes, races, 
and now is applied to non-human species and ecosystems. The concept of rights for 
flora. fauna. and animals can form an absolute constraint on various forms of action 
regardless of the benefits. Deontological ethical theories attribute intrinsic value to 
features of acts themselves. Respectful treatment of natural entities and natural 
systems would then rule out certain types of exploitative acts on deontological 
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grounds (Rodman, 1983). The use of natural entities and systems as objects and 
resources of instrumental value could be precluded on grounds of respect and the 
obligation of non-interference in anything with internal self-direction and self-
regulation. 
This is reflected in A1do Leopold's land ethic which implies a basic right of natural 
beings to continue existing in a natural state (see Leopold, (1949] 1987). Rights 
operate to provide those individuals or things that hold them with moral standing. 
That is, status is an end in itself rather than a means to an end. There are then two 
aspects to the argument for species or site preservation; the instrumental values 
recognised by utilitarianism and in addition intrinsic values (Callicott, 1989, pp.134-5). 
This view of rights can be relaxed and perhaps made more generally acceptable when 
based upon interests and allowing for ranking of rights, see Attfield (1981). 
The utilitarian philosophy has been expressed forcefully by Passmore (1974) who does 
not preclude any area from some eventual development. This reasoning may, as 
Hargrove (1989) has suggested, be more amenable to the British. In Britain there are 
few areas of untouched wilderness and all ecosystems have been altered and managed 
by man. Thus, perhaps, we should be unsurprised that Wordsworth's call for a 
national park in the Lake District fell on deaf ears, while Yellowstone National Park 
was established in the United States. 
So, in returning to the decision-making problem of the conservation agency, the 
recognition of non-human intrinsic values provides reasons for preventing economic 
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exploitation of SSSIs. Under the utilitarian philosophy there can never be absolute or 
permanent protection. If the arguments of those favouring the existence of intrinsic 
values in nature are adopted, such protection can take place, and these sites would be 
excluded from economic calculations. The agency's problem is then altered into 
identifying sites to protect natural objects and species on grounds of what Hargrove 
(1989 p.104) calls intrinsic beauty and interest. 
Thus, sites might be selected as they are now but the arrangement for PDOs would 
have to changed. In order to achieve preservation, sites could no longer be subject to 
the decision-making process described in the previous section or any part of that 
process. If the budgetary constraints were to remain and landowners allowed to 
bargain, economic utilitarianism would be the result. For example, as the value of 
peat rises the more SSSIs will be developed and the more likely is the eventual 
demise of all peat bogs unless the utility value they possess increases. 
IV. WHAT PRICE SSSI PROTECTION? 
The current situation forces the regulatory agency to express its preferences when 
protecting SSSIs from damage. That is, the decision-making process concerning the 
protection of conservation sites is closer to a utilitarian consumer model than to a 
regulation by which our heritage is taken out of development and preserved. The 
position taken by the NCC was one which favoured the intrinsic value model. They 
expressed the opinion that there is intrinsic value in site characteristics (NCC 1990 
Section 4.10). This is most clearly conceded by the following statement (emphasis 
added): 
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Many sites, notified as SSSIs or not, such as ancient woodland or ancient 
meadows, are considered to be irreplaceable and incapable of re-creation in 
any meaningful way. In such cases the site should act as a constraint on a 
project development at any cost. 
This will not occur under the current process which allows for trade-offs under PDOs. 
If the utilitarian approach is followed this maintenance of an exogenous constraint on 
development is explicitly excluded. The process of bargaining described above is one 
in which trade-offs are an essential part. This would be unacceptable to the NCC 
which stated that SSSls "should not be subject to bargaining and trade-off' (NCC 1990 
Section 4.2Oc). 
The setting out of a threshold to identify the minimum stock of sites for conservation 
implies a belief in the need for absolute protection. Currently, landowners are 
allowed to bargain over compensation and the agency is in a weak position to prevent 
either (i) potential damages, or (ii) large compensation payments. In the first case 
the whole purpose of SSSI designation is brought into question. In the second case 
the agency is forced to operate in a utilitarian model ranking sites by 'importance' 
and protecting the most 'valuable'. For example, a landowner could successfully 
extract the agency's entire budget through threatening actions totally unrelated to the 
true opportunity cost of land. The agency would then be unable to protect other 
sites. Thus, implicity the agency is forced to trade-off and bargain. 
Under a system which recognises the need to protect conservation sites absolutely 
there would be no bargaining over the potential for future damages. This system 
would be based on the need to remove land from potential damages. The cost to 
society of doing so is the opportunity cost of that land in alternative uses. A case 
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might be made that landowners are the ones who lose this alternative use of the land 
if private property rights are taken as absolute in a Lockean sense. Currently, 
compensation is paid because landowners rights take precedence over those of society 
at large. The conservation agency is paying the social opportunity cost to landowners 
as income maintenance plus the rent because these sites are scarce. Thus, 
landowners are in the position of finding themselves in possession of conservation-
gold-mines. As with other scarce, finite, natural resources tbe rent can be taxed and 
is no more the right of landowners than of society in general. In this case 
compensation would be set at the level of foregone earnings. However, as the 
utilitarian model shows, there is a large potential for rent extraction by landowners 
confronted by a powerless and weak agency. 
Finally, the very concept of compensation can be compared to the procedure under 
the planning process shown in Figure 2. Consistency across the branch outcomes 
would suggest all rejected planning proposals should be compensated in the same way 
as are the rejected PDOs. This would undoubtably cause a large increase in planning 
proposals; pointing to the negative incentives of the current PDO compensation rule. 
The alternative method of maintaining consistency is to stop compensation payments 
altogether. However, if Figure 3 is studied, the outcome seems likely to be more 
compulsory purchases with the agency ending up in the restricted budget scenario 
described in the utilitarian model. Thus, an intermediate solution, which also is 
compatible with the maintenance of intrinsic values, is to provide compensation only 
for positive management strategies. Of course, SSSls will still be susceptible to 
development under both the planning process and by statutory undertakers. 
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Sites Lost 
Partial Loss 
Long-term Damage 
Short-term Damage 
Table 1. A Years Damage to SSSIs 
(1/4/1990 to 31/3/1991) 
Notified/Renotified Awaiting 
Under 1981 Act HA Renotification 
0 0 0 
4 4 4 
18 1099 2 
127 35061 5 
Sites Lost = Damage Resulting in denotification of whole SSSI. 
Partial Loss = Damage Resulting in de notification of part SSSI. 
HA 
0 
9 
318 
657 
Long-term Damage = Damage causing lasting reduction in the special interest. 
Short-term Damage = Damage from which the special interest could recover. 
Source: NCC 1991. 
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1. Naturalness 
2. Size 
3. Rarity 
4. Diversity 
1. Diversity 
Table 2. Site Evaluation Criteria 
(a) Habitat 
a lack of features indicating gross or recent human modification. 
the area must be big enough for the habitat to be viable. 
the rarer the habitat, the greater the proportion that should be 
conserved. 
greater diversity is, in general, valued positively. 
(b) Species Groups 
which aims to include the interest of assemblages from different 
phytogeographical elements within a site. 
2. Population Size the population of a SSSI must be viable. 
3. Rarity in general, the rarer the species, the larger the proportion of the 
population that qualifies for selection. 
Source: Nature Conservancy Council, 1989. 
Table 3. Operations Ukely to Damage the Features of 
Special Interest on a Raised Bog 
Type of Opcm.jon CIiyinc Stagdlrd R.elel5lKS Number> 
1 Cultivalion, iDdudlJll ptou ... in&. rot ..... lin .. "'rrowin& and ",.....si"," 
1 Gnozin.. The inlrodlKlion ol pain.. a.an ... in Ihe paina "'Jime (inciudina type olllock or inlenaity or IeUOIIaI 
pattem ol paina and ceaaalion ol paing). 
3 Stock fecAlin.. The inlrodlKlion ol .Iock fecdin.. Cbln ... in .Iock fecAling practice. 
4 The iDlrodlKlion ol -u.a etc. CbI .... in lhe maMnl or <uttina "'Jime (including "'y mating to litaae and 
CCIIIlion ). 
, Appliation of Ift8DUN, fertililen and lime. 
6 Appliealion ol palicidel. includin, herbitidea (""edkiller). 
7 Dumpin .. ap_ing or diac ....... ol ony matenall. 
B Bumi ... 
9 The ",ieuc lalo lbe lile ol any wild. feral or domcIIic anlmoi', piont 0< oeed. 
10 The killln, or ",_I ol any wild onimal.' 
11 The deatl\ldion, diaplaccme.~ ",_I or cutting of any plant or pla.1 ",mai ... includin, tree, ahNb, herb, dud or 
dccayinaM>Od, -. liclleo, fun .... , leaf-mould and turr etc. 
12 Tree and/or _ ....,.meDt. The introduction ol In:< and/o< __ acmenl. CbI .... iD lree and/or 
M>Odland maaoac- iDduding a1Torcatation. pionlin .. clear .nd aelediw felU ... tllinDin .. ""!'Picin .. modir"",1ion ol 
lhe IIInd or undcrMlOd, cbo .... in IpCCiea rompoailion. CCIIIlion ol maaoacmcnl. 
130 Drainaac (inciudin, moor-pipping .nd lbe ... ol mole. tile. lunnel or other .nirtcial drai .. ). 
13b Modifa.ioo of the .trvcture of,,'e, COUtICI (c, struma, ~rinp, ditchel, draiM), includin,'heir banb and beck, U 
by ...... Iipment. "'ping .nd dn:dJin .. 
13< Ma .... me.t ol aqualic and baok "'actalion . 
• 4 The chanaina of WIlier Icwla and tltbk:l and water utiliMtion (includina irriptioa, Itorqe and ItbItraction from cxiltina 
waler bodlea.nd Ibrou'" bon:boIea). 
15 Infillin, ol ditch.., drai ... ponda. pooiI or marsh ... 
20 Extraction ol minera ... IDduclin, peal, ahinpe. IOnd and ...... 1, lopIOil •• ubIoiI and apoil. 
21 Conatl\ldion, "'_ or deatrlKlion ol roodI, 1_. walll, fencea, "'nlllanda, banb, ditcbca or other eanhworb, or 
lhe layin .. mainlenance or ",_I ol pipeli .... nd cab"', ._ or belooolJlOUnd. 
23 Bn:ction ol permanenl or temporary "Net.rea, or the undenokinl ol enJinccrina worU, includin, drillin .. 
24 Modir"",tion ol natural 0< man-_ fealu"", ticorancc ol bouldeR, la .... It.,.,.. or _ rock. 
26 UI< ol",bide 0< cnft likely 10 datDIac or dioturb peatland flora and f ..... 
l7 Recrutional, n:ocardI, cd_lional or other activiti .. lik.ly 10 dam ... peatland flora and f.una. 
2B IntrodlKlion ol pm. or waterr"", m'''acment. Cbln ... In pme and waterr"", ma .... m.nt .nd huntin, practice . 
• -animal- mctudea uy 1Um.ma1, reptile, U'lphibian. bird. r.u or inYertebnle. 
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